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We view risk management as an integral part of good management.  Risk management 
should take a balanced view of decision problems encompassing all significant risks and 
rewards.  Operational risks are only one type of risks and therefore are only one piece in 
the jigsaw puzzle that only makes sense when all pieces are assembled.  All risk analyses 
are based on the same general principles – generation of alternatives, quantification of 
uncertainties and preferences, modeling of consequences – but factors deserving the most 
attention vary from problem to problem.  We distinguish three broad types of operational 
risks according to the frequencies of loss events: nominal, ordinary and exceptional. 
Depending on the type, uncertainties are negligible, similar or very large compared to 
expected losses.  Nominal risks are the province of Total Quality Management, a well-
developed discipline, but perhaps better known in manufacturing than in financial 
services.  The analysis of ordinary and exceptional risks is illustrated by case studies 
from which we draw general lessons.  With ordinary risks, it is crucial to understand the 
interaction among risks and with costs and rewards; risks do not add up, indeed 
operational risks may sometime reduce other uncertainties.  With exceptional risks, we 
show the importance of quantifying the risk attitude of a financial institution in order to 
arrive at rational decisions such as mitigation or transfer of risks. 
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Risk Management - An Integral Part of Good Management 
 
The debate between regulators and bankers over the last fifteen years or so has been a 
powerful driver for the development of better risk management and consequently greater 
efficiency in the use of capital resources in the banking industry.  It matters more to see new 
initiatives in this growing field than to argue where they should come from, as long as the two 
sides can agree and keep up with each other.  But do they really agree or are they just 
pretending to agree?  Are the objectives of the regulator and those of the banker sufficiently 
in line to ensure frank and open cooperation?   
 
What is good risk management for a banker and why is it so important? Personally, I do not 
see any distinction between good management and good risk management in a world where 
most important decisions have uncertain outcomes.  If we could know precisely the 
consequences of our actions, good management would reduce to (i) generating attractive 
alternatives and (ii) agreeing on preferences among various possible outcomes.  A good 
decision would simply be the choice of the alternative leading to the preferred outcome; that 
would be the ‘rational’ choice; one may dispute the limits of rationality, yet no manager 
would favour ‘irrationality’.  But when do we know precisely the consequences of our actions 
except in trivial cases? Significant management decisions are taken in the context of complex 
systems where outcomes result from the interaction of many factors not known with certainty, 
including decisions from other economic agents.  Thus management must also be good at (iii) 
identifying and framing the problems to be addressed (iv) translating limited information into 
quantitative probability assessments (v) expressing preferences not only among various 
outcomes but also between various combinations of outcomes with different probabilities, 
what is called risk-preference.   In an uncertain world, good decisions no longer equate to 
good outcomes and good management becomes synonymous with good risk management.  
Risk management is much more than assessing, reporting and controlling risks
1. 
 
It would be a tragedy if, somehow, risk management was seen as a discipline divorced from 
that of management when it should be an integral part of it.  Alas, there are already signs of 
separation.  True, risk management requires that certain specific tasks be carried out by 
qualified staff supervised by independent managers with wide rights of access to information, 
but the support functions including model building, monitoring and reporting, should not be 
confused with risk management itself.  In too many banks, risk management is now seen as 
the task of one department alongside other departments fulfilling other support functions such 
as human resources management and information systems. Whether it is seen as a luxury or a 
mere necessity (to satisfy regulators) is questionable.  It is certainly regarded as a cost center 
for, perhaps, a not so crucial service; witness crises when the risk management department is 
often among the first to be pared down. 
 
The separation is encouraged by supervisors as well as by internal forces.  Banking 
supervisors are more concerned with protecting depositors, investors and other creditors than 
with maximizing returns to shareholders or providing better performance for customers.  So, 
supervisors take a prudent, one-sided view: limit the probability of insolvency and ensure that 
risks are assessed as objectively as possible.  It follows that risk assessments should be carried 
out by staff not reporting to front office managers and not directly and immediately interested 
in the results of the bank.  It follows also that supervisors prefer to focus on ‘measures’ (their 
word) of risk that, they hope, can be obtained objectively and independently of wider 
performance measures. 
                                                        
1 For a primer in decision analysis see Howard [1] and for further developments and applications see  
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Tradition and internal politics conspire with supervisors to isolate the risk management 
function.  In a foregone age of credit controls and rationing rather than pricing, credit risks 
were first sorted out as acceptable or not.  Not so long ago (perhaps even now), many banking 
supervisors wanted the chief credit officer of a bank to have the ultimate responsibility for 
such decisions.  Paradoxically, senior management often agrees with this division of 
responsibilities and even welcomes it for the screening of all sorts of risks.   At first, one may 
wonder why senior management would want to delegate such important decisions.  On 
second thought, one realizes that senior management may find two advantages in this 
approach: (i) if a prospect is not rejected, they have freer hands as they no longer have to 
worry about risks; should a bad outcome ensue, it is the prime responsibility of the risk 
manager who failed to reject the prospect; (ii) if a prospect is rejected as too risky, they do not 
have to consider difficult trade-offs between risks and rewards.  Of course, this approach 
would fail if credit officers and other risk managers, having no incentive to accept risky 
prospects but only fearing potential blame, would reject them all.  But that is not realistic; risk 
managers would rapidly loose their credibility and suffer the general opprobrium of their 
colleagues in profit centers.  They have to accept a decent proportion of all opportunities 
submitted to their review.  Unfortunately, they must decide without having all the elements 
necessary to make a rational choice.  Their decisions have to be arbitrary to some degree. 
 
The reluctance to make trade-offs between risks and rewards is not specific to managers in the 
financial industry.  It is a pervasive modern day pathology; in fact, it is probably less 
pronounced in the financial industry where outcomes are readily measured in cash flows than 
it is in other fields where say, moral values or human lives may be at stake
2.  There is even 
reluctance in some firms to be seen as making decisions at all.  Business decisions are 
irreversible allocations of resources; small or large, they shape the future of a company.  But 
instead of focusing on decisions, many ‘managers’ prefer to talk about management 
‘framework’ and ‘processes’ for ‘monitoring’ and ‘control’. 
 
Two root causes of this disease are (i) judging people on results – because senior managers do 
not know any better – rather than on the quality of their decisions; then survival instincts will 
naturally lead managers to avoid making decisions or to be over-conservative, and (ii) 
fragmentation of responsibilities leaving decision makers not only with partial information 




Nominal, Ordinary and Exceptional Operational Risks 
 
The starting point of good management is to focus attention on critical issues by which I 
mean situations where good ideas and good decisions can make a difference.  There is no 
point worrying about things that cannot be controlled nor any commercial value in gathering 
information unless it may affect some decisions (learning for pleasure is a different matter).  
                                                         
2 Can we put a price on freedom or human life?  Many find the question preposterous, so it remains 
unanswered.  But medical doctors and politicians, among others, face situations requiring such value 
judgments.  Unable to rely on reasoned and publicly agreed views, they must rely on their own 
judgment.  Politicians even find it advantageous at times to play on public emotions (e.g., following a 
major accident) by declaring proudly that they refuse to put any price on human life (e.g., “We shall 
not compromise safety” or “Safety is our only priority, regardless of costs”) or that nothing will stop 
them to preserve freedom.  An intelligent public should ask the exponents of such glaring abdications 
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Events may command attention to particular problems but many opportunities may be missed 
or alternatives become unavailable unless one tries to think ahead about critical issues.  At 
any rate, rarely do problems come well defined and neatly framed as in textbooks.  An open, 
attentive, inquisitive and creative mind and broad experience are prime qualities for a good 
decision maker. 
 
But good individuals cannot succeed in bad organizations.  Some types of internal 
organization and company culture foster forward thinking whereas others stifle it.  An 
organization where functions and responsibilities are highly fragmented, where internal 
communications are limited and codified, where individualism is encouraged more than 
cooperation, where objectives are not clearly defined and shared, where staff and managers 
are too busy with immediate tasks to look at what is happening around them, where blame is 
more readily attributed than rewards, where there is no service ethics, where some key 
executives have an unquestionable authority… is an organization prone to running blindly 
into operational accidents. 
 
If, on the other hand, a firm’s global objectives and values are understood, managers are 
encouraged to look beyond their desks, to communicate and to cooperate, if there are checks 
and balances in the decision making process, if there are individuals (from non-executive 
board members to junior employees) who are given time to think about the future and 
alternative ways of doing business and proper forums to discuss new ideas, then, such a firm 
is less likely to be caught by surprise and more likely to develop efficient ways of doing 
business. 
 
Thus the collection, analysis and reporting of operational loss data is not the be all and end all 
of operational risk management.  At best, it may stimulate reflection about operational 
problems but it is by no means the only or even the privileged starting point.  Consider, for 
example, the operational loss data assembled in Basel’s Second Quantitative Impact Study 
(QIS2-Tranche2) [3]; there is nothing there to suggest that the responding banks are not 
controlling properly their operational risks nor any suggestions about what they should do 
better.  Should they pay more attention to operational loss categories
3 where the largest total 
losses have been recorded? That would be, by business line: 
       
Corporate Finance and Retail Banking: Clients, Products and Business Services 
Trading & Sales and Payment & Settlement: Execution, Delivery and Process Management    
Commercial Banking: External Fraud 
 
Or should they pay more attention to categories creating the largest uncertainties because of 
the presence of few but relatively large losses?  The main categories would be: 
  
Corporate Finance and Retail Banking: Clients, Products and Business Services 
Trading & Sales:  Internal Fraud    
Corporate Finance: External Fraud 
 
In both cases the figures are not particularly impressive. For an average bank in the sample, 
the largest loss categories account each for about 0.1% of capital and the largest uncertainties 
(in standard deviations) about 0.2% of capital.  Small numbers indeed compared to expected 
earnings and earnings variability that are more like 15% and 5% of capital respectively.  
                                                         
3 QIS2 operational loss data contain 90 bank-years of experience (30 banks over years 1998 to 2000) 
arrayed according to the 8 business lines and 7 loss types defined by Basel for their proposed Advanced 
Management Approaches.  For the 56 resulting loss categories, total number of loss events with 
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The debate fueled by the Basel proposals about operational risks will be fruitful if it leads 
some banks to realize that they have not paid enough attention to this type of risks and the 
industry to develop appropriate methods to analyse them.  An interesting subject then is to 
explore whether there are generic methodologies to address situations where operational 
losses play a role. My own view is that it would be useful to distinguish three types of 
operational risks according to loss frequencies because they reveal different salient features: 
(i) Nominal operational risks, (ii) ordinary operational risks, both encompassing the vast 
majority of all operational risks, typically illustrated by QIS2 loss data, and (iii) exceptional 
operational risks, absent from QIS2, a few instances appearing in much larger databases, but 
mostly lurking out in the future. 
 
I call nominal operational risk the risk of repetitive losses (say losses that may occur on 
average once a week or more frequently) associated with an ongoing activity, for example, 
settlement risk, minor external fraud (one credit card lost or stolen every 8 seconds, my bank 
reminds me!), or human error in transaction processing.  Such losses must be taken into 
consideration in the optimization of processes but they hardly deserve to be called risks for 
only the expected losses are significant (many times larger than the standard deviation of 
losses) and should be compared to the cost of controls. We shall not discuss them here, not 
because the subject is unimportant, but because it has been addressed well elsewhere.
  There 
is an excellent literature on the subject of Total Quality Management, a concept first 
developed by the late Edward Demmings who revolutionized the Japanese industry after 
WW2.  Only later were Demmings’ ideas accepted in his home country, the USA.  They are 
now applied successfully in most industrialized countries and most industries (see your local 
Total Quality Management Group and the TQM journal).  A frequent conclusion after 
studying nominal risks is that they are excessively costly; improved procedures and a better 
quality culture often proves not only to be less expensive immediately but also to have 
beneficial long term effects on client relationships and reputation.  Many of the methods 
currently proposed to tackle operational risks in banking are designed to cope with nominal 
risks, i.e., with expected operational losses.  It would not be surprising if many financial 
institutions came to realize that nominal operational losses are very costly and business could 
be conducted more efficiently with greater emphasis on quality of services. 
  
Ordinary operational risks I define as the risk of less frequent (say between one a week and 
one every generation) but larger losses, yet not life threatening for financial institutions.  They 
are usually one among several important consequences of a strategic choice and should be 
analysed within the wider context of that choice; in particular, the relationships between these 
risks and other risks associated with to the same strategic choice need to be understood.  We 
give an illustration in the first case study below. 
 
Of the Exceptional operational risks (say losses that have no more than a few per cent 
chances of occurrence over a year) only those that may be life threatening to financial 
institutions matter.  These risks deserve specific attention.  We discuss them later and use a 
second case study in which we illustrate the importance of quantifying a firm’s risk appetite 
to make rational decisions. 
 
On a log-frequency/ log-severity diagram
4, the three main types of operational risks we have 
just defined could be mapped approximately as in Figure 1.  We have also separated out in the 
                                                         
4 The diagramme displays loss categories on decimal logarithm scales for frequency (vertically) and 
relative severity (horizontally).  The frequencies are calculated by dividing the number of loss events 
recorded in QIS2 by 90 (the number of bank-years in the database); the relative severities are ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2002-21 
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lower left-hand corner the loss categories that are too small to be material (we chose to ignore 
categories where both the expected loss and the standard deviation of losses is less than ten 
thousandth of the current minimum regulatory capital
5).  Obviously, the boundaries we have 
drawn are only approximate limits between zones where attention should be given either to 
expected losses or to risks (i.e., uncertainties), or where these features are negligible.  To 
summarise, for: 
 
Immaterial Losses:  Both expected losses and risks are negligible 
Nominal Operational Risks: Expected losses are much more important than risks 
Ordinary Operational Risks: Both Risks and expected losses are significant 
Exceptional Operational Risks: Risks are much more important than expected losses 
 
More than half the operational losses reported in QIS2  (shown by the small diamonds in 
Figure 1) fall into the immaterial zone.  Not surprisingly, the rest would be classified as 
Ordinary Operational Risks.  The only category near the Nominal Operational Risks boundary 
is External Fraud in Retail Banking although there would have been many nominal risks 
reported in QIS2 data if it had not been for the cut-off reporting level of €10,000 per loss.  
The few reported rare risks have low impact and are therefore immaterial.  As expected, no 
truly Exceptional Operational Risks shows up in QIS2 data.  The category that would come 
closest is External Fraud in Corporate Finance 
 





















                                                                                                                                                                    
calculated by dividing the average loss per loss event by €3 billion, a conservative estimate of the 
average capital of the banks in the sample.  
5 Minimum regulatory capital (MRC) is defined as the capital requirement for credit and market risks 
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More than half the operational losses reported in QIS2 fall into the immaterial zone.  Not 
surprisingly, the rest would be classified as Ordinary Operational Risks.  The only category 
near the Nominal Operational Risks boundary is External Fraud in Retail Banking although 
there would have been other nominal risks reported in QIS2 data if it had not been for the cut-
off reporting level of €10,000 per loss.  The few observed rare risks have low impact and are 
therefore immaterial.  As expected, no significant Exceptional Operational Risk shows up in 
QIS2 data.  The category that would come closest is External Fraud in Corporate Finance.  
 
 
An Ordinary Operational Risk Case Study 
 
We choose an example from the category Client, Products and Services in Corporate 
Finance, which appears in both lists of top expected losses and risks
6.  Suppose that within 
corporate finance, the bond origination department is forecast to win about two mandates per 
month and that each successful deal brings an average of €4 million in fees.  However, a few 
deals have turned sour over the years because of poor preparation, incorrect pricing, 
erroneous disclosures, etc.  Most of these errors resulted in the bank being unable to place its 
entire share of the issue at the expected price and losing money on the rump, having to pay 
additional fees to other managers or, occasionally being sued by investors.  The best guesses 
of managers in the debt origination department is that, given the current organization and 
market conditions, there may be about one bad case per year with an average loss of €10 
million.  The bond origination activity employs 100 people and has an expense budget of €30 
million.  History shows that it has also generated market losses of about 10% of fees on 
average.  
 
The departmental budget for next year is summarised in Table 1.  Note that the case study has 
been designed to exaggerate operational losses reported in QIS2 for the corresponding 
category; the frequency of losses has been increased 6 fold and the average severity by 20%. 
 
 
Table 1: Debt Origination – Base Case Budget 
 
Expected number of mandates  25     
Expected fee per mandate  €4m  Expected revenue  €100m 
Operational loss probability  4%     
Expected operational loss per 
loss event 
€10m  Expected operational loss  €10m 
Expected market losses (% fee)  10%  Expected market loss  €10m 
    Expense budget  €30m 
    Expected gross income  €50m 
 
At first sight, this is a good business, good enough for employees to expect bonuses at year-
end.  Of course, it is not without uncertainties, so we call the budget above the base case 
budget (we cannot pretend at this stage that it is the most likely case or the expected case or 
anything more significant than a starting point in our analysis). 
 
                                                         
6 This example is hypothetical; the figures are purely illustrative and are not meant to reflect the 
economics of any particular firm ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2002-21 
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Which uncertainties could have the greatest impact on gross income? It is laborious to 
translate views into probabilities and it is costly to gather additional information to narrow 
down uncertainties, so we proceed step by step, starting with a simple, ‘back-of-the-envelope’ 
sensitivity analysis to discover the most influential factors
7.  For each of the entries in the 
budget table above, we ask the relevant managers to state a range of possible variations that 
would not unduly surprise them, say a range that, in their mind, would have about two 
chances in three of capturing the correct figure. The answers are given below together with 
their marginal impact on gross income.    
 
Table 2: Debt Origination – Sensitivities 
 
Key Factors  Base case  Range 
Low         High 
Gross Income 
Variations (€m) 
Number of mandates p.a.  25  18          33  23       81  
Average fee per mandate  €4m  €3m     €5m  25       75 
Number of operational loss events 
p.a. 
1  0           3  60        30 
Average operational loss per loss 
event 
€10m  €5m      €20m  55        40 
Average market losses (% fee)  10%  5%          20%  55        40 
Expense budget  €30m  €27m     €35m  53        45 
 
The sensitivity table calls for a few remarks: 
 
(i) There is an intrinsic uncertainty in the origination activity. Whilst we may expect and be 
prepared for 25 mandates per year, each opportunity for a deal and each mandate won is 
the result of not only hard work but also luck.  We could describe the process as a 
succession of independent mandates won at an average rate of 25 per year.  The most 
general mathematical description of this process is the Poisson process
8; it implies that 
for a given average rate, one standard deviation for the actual number of mandates is the 
square root of the rate of arrival, here 5, which leads to a range of uncertainty on gross 
income of ± €16m
9. But in addition management is uncertain about the rate of arrival of 
mandates.  Say they give the rate of arrival a 66% range from 20 to 31.  The figures 
appearing in the range for the number of mandates show approximately the combined 
effect of these two uncertainties
10. 
(ii) Likewise an operational loss rate of 4% on an average of 25 deals, or one loss per year, 
would also create an intrinsic uncertainty of almost ± 1 loss or ± €10m.  The figures 
shown in the range combine this intrinsic statistical uncertainty with an uncertainty about 
the operational loss event probability.  Note also that the probability of an operational 
loss may be related to the total number of deals; we shall come back to this point later. 
(iii) The sensitivities have been calculated one by one, holding all factors at their base case 
values except for the one being tested.  In reality, factors may move together and, as a 
                                                         
7 Note that in in the recently developed 
8 The Poisson assumption is probably a slight exaggeration of the uncertainty because the team is likely 
to work harder and have more time available if few mandates are won, and vice versa.   
9 Revenue per mandate, net of operational and market losses, is €4m – 4%(€10m) – 10%(€4m) = 
€3.2m or €16m for 5 mandates 
10 A 66% range is about 2 standard deviations but this one is not quite symmetrical around the mean 
(25-5, 25+6).  Combining two independent uncertainties with standard deviations of 5 an 5.5 yields a 
total standard deviation of 7.4 but due to the asymmetry around the mean, we choose 25-7 and 25+8 as 
a range. ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2002-21 
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result, the relative importance of each factor may be different from what it appears to be 
in the sensitivity table.  For example, uncertainties about ‘Average market losses’ and 
about ‘Average operational loss per loss event’ appear to have similar impacts.  In reality 
the uncertainty on market losses may be more significant because it is probably related to 
the rate of generation of mandates: in lean times, there are not only fewer mandates but 
also greater placement difficulties leading to potentially greater market losses.  An 
opposite relationship may hold for operational losses: the busier the team the greater the 
chance of a major error and vice versa.  It should also be noted that gross income is not a 
linear function of all risk factors and therefore the combined effect of several factors may 
be greater or smaller than the sum of their marginal effects. 
 
Keeping in mind the limitations of the sensitivity analysis, it is still fair to say that the first 
two factors ‘Number of mandates p.a.’ and ‘Average fee per mandate’ have the greatest 
impact on gross income and management’s attention would be well spent finding alternative 
strategies that could influence these two factors to reduce risks and/or to increase gross 
income.  Alternative strategies could be: a general increase of the departmental resources, 
new ways of seeking profitable mandates, e.g., concentration of efforts on large deals, 
strengthening of experience in some country/sector, adjustment of fee/pricing policies, etc… 
Other factors are less important but, because ‘Number of operational loss events p.a.” comes 
third on the list and we are discussing operational risks, let us suppose that a keen operational 
risk manager has convinced senior management that it seems ridiculous to loose perhaps 
€10m to €30m per year because of flawed deals.  After all, €30m is equal to the expense 
budget of the department.  It would seem that, with a bit more resources and care, such 
operational losses could be greatly reduced. 
 
To formulate a simple decision, suppose a 20% increase in personnel and other resources is 
considered at an additional cost of €5m per year.  The operational risk manager proposes that 
the extra resources be used to do a more thorough and professional job and avoid operational 
losses rather than to try to increase the volume of business – that is alternative A.  The head of 
department proposes to explore also the consequences of using these extra resources to try to 
capture more business, keeping the working practices unchanged – that is alternative B. We 
summarise the expected impacts of the two alternatives compared to the status quo in Table 3: 
 
Table 3: Debt Origination – Alternative Strategies 
 
Strategy  Status Quo  Alternative A  Alternative B 
Arrival rate of mandates  25  25  28 
Operational loss probability per 
mandate 
4%  1%  4% 
Expense budget  €30m  €35m  €35m 
 
 
Under Strategy A, the 20% increase in resources is expected to decrease the probability of 
making a significant error from 4% down to 1% per deal  (it is very hard to eliminate all 
possibilities of error). Under Strategy B, the number of mandates is expected to increase by 
only 12% because of stiff competition and limited markets.  All other factors except for the 
€5m increase in expenses remain the same as in the status quo. 
 
A quick reckoning shows that Alternative A achieves an expected operational loss saving of 
€7.5m  (=3%(25x10)) for an extra cost of €5m, whereas Alternative B is expected to 
increases revenues by €9.6m (=12%(100 – 10 – 10)) for the same extra cost.  Prima facie, the ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2002-21 
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two alternatives appear favourable compared to the status quo, but B is not a clear winner as 
A has been designed to be less risky than the status quo whereas Alternative B will amplify 
the risks. 
 
Again we try a ‘back-of-the-envelope’ calculation to determine whether the relative riskiness 
of the three alternatives might influence our choice.  We assume Poisson arrivals of mandates, 
and, given a mandate, an independent binomial process for the occurrence of a foul up. For 
each mandate, we assume a fee distribution with standard deviation equal to its expected 
value and, likewise, for each operational loss, a standard deviation equal to the expected loss.  
On this basis and including uncertainties for other factors in line with the sensitivity ranges 







 Table 4: Debt Origination – Evaluation of alternative strategies 
 
Strategy  Status Quo  Alternative A  Alternative B 
Expected gross income  €50m  €52.5m  €54.6m 
Standard deviation of gross inc.  €37.8m  €36.6m  €40.0m 
Probability of negative gross inc.  9.3%  7.6%  8.6% 
 
No great surprise here except perhaps that the risk reduction achieved by the ‘safe’ 
Alternative A is only nominal.  Indeed, a complete elimination of operational losses, if it were 
feasible, could be shown to result in a standard deviation of  €36.2m, a very small risk 
reduction compared to €37.8m standard deviation with the status quo.  Both Alternatives A 
and B appear more favourable than the status quo but there is not much to choose between 
them.  A more refined analysis would be necessary (including a better description of 
objectives, e.g., return on capital, risk attitude, etc.) to arrive at a definitive conclusion
12.  
Perhaps more importantly, it would be useful to imagine better alternative strategies or turn 
management’s attention towards more critical problems – all the analysis in the world cannot 
make up for the lack of one good idea! 
 
This case study is only meant as an illustration but it reveals two general reasons why 
ordinary operational risks are unlikely to play a significant role in risk management (even 
when grossly exaggerated compared to recorded loss experience).  First, ordinary operational 
risks are only one type among the many types of risks faced by a firm, including large risks 
that are not recognized in current and proposed regulations.  As we see in our case study, the 
predominant risks found in the bond origination activity are: number of mandates won and 
profitability of each mandate; such risks are classified as business risks by Basel and simply 
ignored under Pillar 1.  The second reason is that ordinary operational risks will often be 
negatively correlated with the main risks.  An increase in activity, increasing revenues, is 
                                                         
11 The specific parameters used in our calculations (other than those already described) are: 
Standard deviation of rate of arrival of mandates: 20% and standard deviation of expense budget: 
8.33%. 
12 It would be improper to say that the choice between ‘A’ and ‘B’ is difficult; indifferent or not 
material would be more apposite. ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2002-21 
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often linked with an increase in operational risk exposure, be it human error, client fraud, or 
even system failure.  Thus, paradoxically, operational risks could even reduce total risks
13.   
 
The main lesson is that risk management, as part of good management, should be concerned 
with all aspects of risks and revenues.  Ignoring some aspects is likely to lead to poor 
decisions. Thus the emphasis put by Basel on operational risk could be useful if that aspect 
was previously overlooked – although there is no evidence that it was; conversely, it could be 
dangerous if it focused attention too much on this type of risks and away from other risks and 
costs, for example by requesting a narrowly defined monitoring of operational losses and 
providing incentives targeted to reduce operational losses without regard to other economic 
factors.  Alas, this is what Pillar 1 does. 
 
 
Understanding Exceptional Operational Risks 
 
Are there common features among what we called exceptional operational risks beyond their 
defining characteristics of rarity and severe consequences?  Table 5 lists a dozen cases of 
banking, broking and asset management institutions that were greatly affected by operational 
losses over the last twelve years.  Ten of these went bankrupt, were taken over or were forced 
to merge as a consequence of their losses.  One could not say that these are the most 
significant operational losses recorded over the period without entering into a debate on 
ranking criteria (for example: how to account for the impact of the loss, the size of the 
company, the strength of the operational causality, etc.).  Let us say simply that these are 
representative exceptional operational losses. 
 
It is striking that the twelve cases listed were consequences of deliberate actions and 
not mere accidents.  In at least ten cases these actions were unethical, illegal or 
criminal
 14. They were not necessarily initiated by senior management, but they were 
at least allowed to endure by management incompetence or negligence. The root 
cause, not surprisingly, is individual and corporate greed.   
 
Table 5: Exceptional Operational Risks Illustrations 
 
 Company   Cause of Loss 
 
(1991) Salomon Brothers (US)  US T-Bond primary market manipulation 
(1993) Bank of Commerce and Credit 
International (BCCI) (Luxembourg) 
Illegal activities (drugs, arms) 
(1994) Kidder Peabody (US)  Management incompetence 
                                                         
13 For the sake of curiosity, the reader could modify the parameters of the case study to create an 
increase in total risks when reducing operational risk.  One way is to choose an expected operational 
loss equal to the expected fee and a standard deviation of operational loss smaller than the expected 
fee.  Another way is to develop a more realistic model showing that the probability of error, for a given 
department size, increases with the amount of work to be done, that is, with the number of contracts 
won.   
14 The two special cases are:  (i) The September 11 terrorist strike – although it had been planned for 
years by its perpetrators, it still came as a total surprise to the victims; (ii) The reduced final bonus 
policy put in place by The Equitable Life Assurance Society to offset the benefits of guaranteed 
annuity rates given to some policy holders was, in the end, judged illegal by the UK House of Lords 
but this ruling was difficult to foresee.      ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2002-21 
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(1995) Barings (UK)  Rogue trader and management incompetence 
(1995) Daiwa Securities (Japan)  Involvement with gangsters 
(1996) Bankers Trust (US)  Selling products clients did not fully 
understand 
(1997) Morgan Grenfell (UK)  Unauthorised investments in illiquid assets 
(1997) Natwest Markets (UK)  Mispricing of derivatives 
(2000) The Equitable Life Assurance Society 
(UK) 
Non-respect of guaranteed annuity contracts 
(2001) Cantor Fitzgerald and others (US)  Terrorist attack on World Trade Center 
(2002) Allied Irish Bank (US)  Rogue trader 
(2002) Merrill Lynch (US)  Biased analyst recommendations 
 
 
A second feature of the observed exceptional operational risks is the diversity in their 
manifestations. The ingenuity of an unscrupulous human mind is unbounded when it comes to 
devising new ways to profit from an insufficiently controlled environment.  Firms are less 
likely to fall victim to the same scheme than to fall into new traps.  With globalisation, new 
products, new technologies, increased competition and pressure to perform, one may expect 
new forms of operational risks in the future. The observed heterogeneity of circumstances in 
which exceptional operational losses have occurred should help exorcise a few ghosts before 
sketching an appropriate methodology to tackle exceptional operational risks. 
 
The first ghost is the belief that ‘industry wide’ operational loss databases will provide the 
basis to assess exceptional risks.  Some companies have launched into the collection of 
operational losses across financial institutions and continents in the vain hope that an 
exceptional loss incurred by, say, a broker in Bombay could help ‘fatten the tail’ of an 
operational loss distribution for an asset manager in Manhattan.  Of course, there are always 
things to learn from the past – one might even argue that there is nothing else to learn from – 
but the mere recording of a loss amount in one firm cannot be translated mechanically into a 
probability and severity of loss in another firm.  On the other hand, the anecdotal evidence 
about the way disasters occurred (or were avoided – there must be more near disasters than 
actual disasters and therefore more to learn from them) and the way they were handled may 
be very informative; it may stimulate thoughts and help discover vulnerabilities in one’s 
organisation and therefore identify potential problems to be examined; that is a lot, but that is 
all.  
 
The second ghost is the belief that extreme value theory (EVT), a branch of probability theory 
and statistics, can make an important contribution to the assessment of exceptional 
operational risks.  EVT was developed many years ago to describe the distribution of extreme 
values in repetitive processes 
15.  In mathematical term, it is possible to describe the 
probability distribution of the maximum value (or the distribution of excess over threshold) in 
a set of observations of identically and independently distributed random variables (i.i.d), 
based on a few assumptions about the underlying distribution (about its tail in particular).  
Thus, Gumbel produced estimates of the floods of the Colorado River based on many years of 
observations of river flows at Black Canyon.  In general, EVT has been successful at 
describing extremes of physical processes where a theory gives some indication about the 
underlying distribution and the observations are i.i.d.  More recently EVT has been applied 
with some success in finance (maximum variations of the stock market) and insurance 
                                                         
15 See for example: Gumbel, E.J, Statistics of Extremes, Columbia University Press, New York, 1958 
and Embrechts, P., C. Kluppelberg and T. Mikosch, Modeling Extremal Events, Springer Verlag, 
Berlin, 1991 ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2002-21 
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(estimation of extreme losses of a given type) under similar circumstances.  But to try to 
apply EVT to a small set of unrelated operational losses in different firms around the globe is 
another triumph of wishful thinking over reason.  At best, it could be used to study the 
extreme severities in one category of what we called ordinary operational risks, provided 
losses have been observed many times and may be assumed (perhaps after recalibration) to 
follow the same distribution. 
 
A poor cousin of the EVT ghost has also been spotted around financial institutions, often in 
the company of management consultants; we shall call him the extreme value simulation 
ghost, or EVS for short. The EVS ghost proceeds like this.  Start with a large external 
operational losses database that contains all sorts of loss events.  Screen out the events that 
obviously could not occur in the firm under review; e.g., no rogue trader losses in a firm not 
involved in trading.  Somehow, scale the severities of the remaining events to the relative size 
of the firm (perhaps by looking at relative size and number of transactions).  Also scale the 
number of loss events to one year for the relevant firm.  For example, if there are N loss 
events remaining in the revised database contributed over Y years by banks with an adjusted
16 
total capital C whereas the capital of the target firm is c, the expected equivalent number of 
loss events during one year for the target firm could be assessed as E(n) = Nc/(CY).  The 
penultimate step is now to pick at random n loss events among the N events in the database, 
where n is a random variable (perhaps Poisson distributed) with mean E(n).  The sum of all n 
losses gives a realisation of what could be operational losses for the target firm over one year.  
The final step is to repeat the sampling exercise 10,000 or perhaps 100,000 or a million times 
(computers are fast and cheap) to create a histogram of losses with about 10 occurrences (100 
or 1000 respectively) beyond the 99.9% quantile, thus yielding an estimate of losses at that 
confidence level.  The whole process can be obfuscated with enough technical jargon to make 
it look scientific and justify a high fee.  
 
What’s wrong with EVS? Aside from all the difficulties in trying to make external data 
relevant for a specific firm, the main problem is confusing the observation of a few rare loss 
events with a model for extreme losses.  As we have discussed, the extreme tail, or 99.9% 
quantile, of an operational loss distribution is dominated by the possibility of a few very large 
impact but very improbable losses.  The largest industry-wide databases will still contain just 
a few examples of these exceptional losses and therefore can only lead to highly unreliable 
estimates of their probabilities.  For example, if 5 loss events of a certain type are observed in 
a 5,000 firm-years database, should the probability of occurrence of such events in one firm 
over the next year be estimated at one in a thousand?  Statistics tell us that the probability of 
occurrence could very well be twice as small or twice as big.  And what about the probability 
of several of these events happening in one year?  How small? We do not have much of an 
idea unless we examine these events in detail.  Perhaps if one happens now it cannot happen 
again for several years or precludes others from happening.  Or, at the other extreme, the 
occurrence of one may greatly increase that of others as in a chain reaction
17.  All that, which 
is crucial, is overlooked by EVS.  It is a blind approach.       
                                                         
16 Capital corresponding only to relevant activities of the target bank 
17 I heard Prof. R Howard of Stanford University, whom many regard as the father of modern decision 
analysis, give this vivid illustration of a combination of rare events.  Suppose your company has 
invested in the biggest most luxurious, most state of the art and safest ocean liner in history and you 
want to assess the main risks for this ship that will cruise the North Atlantic route.  Historical records 
will show damages or complete loss of ships due to heavy seas, collisions with other ships or icebergs, 
fires, mechanical problems, etc.  Loss severities depend on the preparedness of the crew, the 
availability of lifeboats, communications, proximity to other ships etc.  A consultant might well have 
used these data and, after scaling and numerous simulations, come up with a loss distribution and an 
estimate of the 99.9% quantile.  The ship was the Titanic and we know what happened during her ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2002-21 
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An Exceptional Operational Risk Case Study 
 
Is there a general methodology that can be devised to analyse rare but important operational 
risks? I do not think that there is a single approach or mathematical technique, but there are a 
couple of features that must be recognized and addressed in any meaningful approach. The 
first is the need for models to assess low probabilities; the second is the need for a 
quantitative tradeoff between profit (or cost) and uncertainty, i.e., an expression of risk 
attitude, to enable a rational choice among alternative courses of action to deal with 
exceptional risks.  Courses of action span a range from risk retention, perhaps combined with 
additional safety measures, to partial or total risk transfer (insurance, outsourcing).  In the 
spirit of the previous comments about the nature of exceptional risks we illustrate a general 
approach by looking at a new type of man-made threat – a computer super-virus that could 
affect an e-banking venture. 
 
An E-banking Venture  
 
A leading bank plans to gain market share through an e-banking subsidiary.  Considerable 
efforts have been put into ensuring the reliability and client safety of the systems: multi-key 
authentication, encrypted communications, transmission firewalls, systems redundancy 
including distributed processing and multiple data storage centers, disaster recovery sites, etc.  
But is there any protection against a mad individual bent on creating havoc for whatever 
reason? Alas, brilliant but twisted minds are not rare. 
 
We know how rapidly a known organic virus can spread and how difficult it may be to 
control, viz. the recent foot-and-mouth epidemic in Great Britain.  The consequences of more 
potent, perhaps yet unknown, viruses could be devastating.  Computer viruses can also be 
very potent.  Designed by man, they can be very infectious
18; they can have a very long 
‘incubation’ period during which they spread undetected.  They can be designed to break 
down safety mechanisms, to reveal confidential information that will permit fraud, to wipe 
out critical information on a broad scale and to render systems unusable for a time.  Like 
meteorites, they are not uncommon.  Thousands have been detected and dealt with by 
specialist companies before they could spread too far and create huge damages.  Yet, one day, 
one could have devastating consequences. 
 
To assess the probability of a computer virus infection and its potential damages, a detailed 
map of the systems hardware and software will be studied by experts looking at possible entry 
points for the virus, deciding where should be the main firewalls, which tests, where and at 
what frequencies should be carried out, what recovery strategy should be put in place 
depending on the extent and severity of the infection. Many decisions will require trade offs 
between safety and costs or convenience.  For example, should a time consuming virus check 
                                                                                                                                                                    
maiden voyage.  The unique combination of rare circumstances during this fateful crossing – wanting 
to regain the blue ribbon and therefore progressing at maximum speed along the shortest route, further 
North than normal; ship more than full with passengers, much festivities on board, minimum watch, 
incredulity at first about the scale of the accident and slow reaction time, lack of life saving equipment 
and unavailability of some because of heavy listing, etc., etc – makes the historical data largely 
irrelevant.  Vice versa, much more can be learned about this disaster for future safety management than 
from the mere recording of one major loss event.  
18 Viruses have been transmitted by simple emails without the recipient having to open any file or 
simply by accessing an Internet service. ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2002-21 
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be carried out every time a connection is established with a client?  Should backups of all 
communications and transactions be kept in various remote places?  What resources should be 
arranged on a standby basis to recreate lost or corrupted records?  In the terms and conditions 
for opening accounts, which liabilities will the bank be prepared to accept and which will they 
decline; should a guarantee on client moneys be provided by the parent bank? Could part or 
nearly all the operations be outsourced to a major IT company that would bear the main 
responsibility in case of a virus attack?  Could the bank purchase insurance to cover at least 
some of the risks? 
 
It would be all too easy to lose sight of the essential when studying such complex situations. 
A team of experts without management guidance would be no better than a patrol of ants 
trying to make sense of a Pollock painting by running all over it.  Good managers and 
decision analysts have found from experience two semi-universal laws: 
 
(i) Experts will often get lost in details and be overconfident about their state of knowledge; 
after all, they are being paid to know.  Thus systems analyses will include a vast number 
of variables but scenarios about what may happen will be confined to rather narrow, 
uninventive ranges. 
(ii) Decision situations, no matter how complex at first sight, are generally dominated by just 
a few critical factors, be they dominant sources of uncertainty or key decision variables.  
The art of decision making is to identify these factors and focus the analysis on them. 
 
Critical factors are identified step by step by refining a model and assessing consequences 
iteratively.  The decision situation can be depicted with the help of an influence diagramme 
(see 7.3.4): some nodes represent choices between alternatives (decision variables), others 
sources of uncertainty (state variables); terminal nodes reflect states of the systems to which 
values can be attributed.  The connections leading to terminal nodes represent the interactions 
between decisions and external factors leading to various terminal states of the systems with 
corresponding probabilities.  One starts with a simple representation and conducts sensitivity 
analyses.  Unimportant state variables are set at fixed values; unimportant decision are 
simplified or predetermined. But the most influential factors are subjected to further 
investigations: additional information is sought where economically justified; large 
uncertainties are described with full distributions; major alternatives are refined.  This type of 
approach has been used in a number of industries to analyse complex systems and assess 




Proceeding along these lines but without further details, suppose the e-banking venture has 
been summarized to a choice between two main strategies:  
 
(i) Standard Safety – All measures are put in place to protect against known strains of 
computer viruses and new strains as they are discovered.  The business plan, taking into 
account the initial investment and projections of revenues and operating costs over the 
effective life of the venture, indicates an €800 million expected net present value in the 
absence of any super-virus attack but a loss of  €400 million if a super-virus strikes.  The 
probability of the latter event is perceived at around 5%.  Of course there are enormous 
uncertainties around all of these figures.  These are indicated in Table 6 
(ii) Enhanced Safety – Extra precautions are taken which will not only increase the initial 
investment and the operating costs but are also expected to reduce market share because 
                                                         
19 Probabilities of failure with ensuing fatalities can typically be set at one in a million to one in 100 
million per year or per mission.   ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2002-21 
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the services will be less user friendly.  Consequently, the net present value of the venture 
is lower than under the Standard Safety plan but the probability of a super bug attack is 
reduced to about 0.5% and the consequences (e.g., reputational effects) are also 
mitigated.  The key figures for the two alternatives are reported in Table 6 
        
Table 6: E-banking Alternative Strategies   
 
Strategy  Standard Safety  Enhanced Safety 
Probability of super bug strike  5%  0.5% 
Net present value if no strike  €800 ± 200 million  €500 ± 200 million 
Net present value if strike  -€400± 200 million   -€350 ± 150 million  
 
A few comments are in order: 
 
1 There is no hiding the difficulty of reducing a choice of strategies to simple terms.  
All outcomes must be reduced to monetary values. Future cash flows must be 
expressed at a present value using some discount factor (normally the minimum 
return on capital required by the parent bank).  Uncertainties must be assessed and 
aggregated.  The relative importance of various choices must be ascertained to 
identify the few most critical.   
2 The probabilities of a super bug strike during the effective life of the venture (i.e., 
many years) would be most difficult to assess.  The views of experts could span wide 
ranges; for example, 5% for the Standard Safety strategy could mean somewhere 
between 2% and 10%.  But, interestingly, we shall see that uncertainty about such 
probabilities should not be a major concern; that is why no uncertainty range for the 
probability of a super bug strike has been shown in Table 4.7 
3 The losses in case of a strike are larger for the Standard than for the Enhanced Safety 
Strategy for several reasons.  First, the venture being a limited liability company, 
direct losses to the parent company cannot be larger than the capital they have 
invested in the venture, which capital may be larger for the Standard Safety strategy 
because of greater operational risk capital requirements. Second, whatever the legal 
limitations to the liability of the parent bank, there will be reputational damages and 
these will be more limited if the parent bank can show that exceptional precautions 
had been taken.  Third, the Enhanced Safety strategy can be thought as having 
additional mechanisms in place to contain the severity of the damages.  The results 
we show in case of a super-virus attack mean that the initial investment of the parent 
bank would be wiped out and there are additional but uncertain reputational losses.  
In other words, the losses to the parent bank attributable to the super-virus are 
perceived as €1200 ± 200 million under the Standard Safety strategy and €850 ± 150 
million under the Enhanced Safety strategy. 
 
Now let us compare the two alternatives.  On an expected value basis, the Standard Safety 
strategy is a clear winner with an expected value of €740 million against €496 million for the 
Enhanced Safety strategy
20.  But that ignores the risks and the directors of the parent bank 
may have different opinions about the right choice, indeed they are all entitled and expected 
to defend their own views; still a decision must be reached. 
 
Quantification of Risk Attitude 
                                                         
20 The expected values are: (i) for the Standard Safety strategy 95%(800) – 5%(400) = 740 and (ii) for 
the Enhanced Safety strategy 99.5%(500) – 0.5%(350) = 495.75 ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2002-21 
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Each situation where risks play a determinant role could be decided on a case by case basis, 
perhaps on a majority vote, and that is indeed how many important business decisions are 
taken.  At the same time, there should be some feeling of uneasiness about the subjective 
nature of this decision process.  One should like to ensure a minimum degree of consistency 
across successive decisions.  It would not make sense if, say depending on the mood of the 
moment, the decisions were wildly fluctuating over time from risk averse to risk taking.  
Likewise, it would not make sense if some opportunities were deemed to be too risky for one 
division but desirable for another.  The firm could be arbitraged, that is, one could imagine a 
hypothetical third party being paid to take away opportunities that are too risky from one 
division only to sell them at a profit to another division. 
 
It would be much more satisfactory if risky opportunities could be summarized in a 
systematic way by just one number, something like a minimum selling price, that would 
encapsulate the degree of risk aversion of a firm.  Intuitively, the degree of risk aversion or 
trade-off between risks and rewards ought to be relatively stable.  It should evolve over time 
with the accumulated results of the firm but only progressively and, at any point in time, there 
should be only one local trade-off otherwise, as we mentioned earlier, the firm could be 
vulnerable to arbitrage. 
 
Fortunately, the methodology exists; it has been developed more than 50 years ago and is 
known as utility theory
21.  The fact that it is not widely used has more to do with conflicts 
between personal interests of decision makers and the good of a company – a subject far 
beyond the scope of this chapter – than to any flaw in the theory.  The concept is simple and 
based on just a few basic rules of behaviour that no businessman would knowingly want to 
violate.  A utility theory primer is given in the Appendix to this chapter.  We shall assume for 
the rest of this discussion that the parent bank, as part of its risk management framework, has 
chosen to describe its risk attitude with the utility function represented in Figure 2.    
 
 
                                                         
21 Utility theory was developed in 1947 by the mathematician John von Neumann and the economist 
Oskar Morgenstern.  ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2002-21 
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s that have gone through the effort of drawing a utility function are generally satisfied with an 
exponential fit, i.e., a function of the form  
 
u(x) = l(1 – exp(-x/l) 
 
where the parameter l, called coefficient of risk tolerance is in the range of 10% to 20% of 
the capital of the firm.  To clarify the evaluations in our case study, we shall assume that the 
parent bank has capital of the order of €3 billion, and adopts an exponential utility function 
with a coefficient of risk tolerance of €500 million.  That is the utility curve actually plotted 
in Figure 2. 
 
Choice of Strategy, Value of Information and Value of Insurance 
 
(a) The best strategic choice as a function of risk attitude 
 
The two alternative strategies, Standard and Enhanced Safety, are far from yielding normally 
distributed outcomes, so it would be inaccurate to use the mean/variance approximation of the 
certain equivalent.  We therefore carry out exact calculations of the certain equivalent for 
each strategy but we assume, for simplicity that the main risks of the e-banking venture are 
independent from the existing risks of the parent bank. The results, together with the expected 
values, are shown in Table 7 
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Strategy  Standard Safety  Enhanced Safety 
Expected value  €740 million  €496 million 
Certain Equivalent (l = €500m)  €557 million  €449 million 
 
With the €500m level of risk tolerance the decision should be clearly in favour of the 
Standard Safety alternative; it is worth €108m more than the Enhanced Safety alternative.  
But given that the €500m level of risk tolerance is rather an order of magnitude than a precise 
figure, it would be interesting to know at what level of risk tolerance the decision could shift 
in favour of the Enhanced Safety alternative or perhaps even in favour of abandoning both 
alternatives because they would be deemed too risky.  To that end we calculate the certain 
equivalent of both alternatives over a wide range of risk tolerance coefficients.  The results 
are plotted in Figure 3. 
 
























The evaluations show that as long as the coefficient of risk tolerance is above €350m, the 
Standard Safety strategy is the preferred option.  For a risk tolerance between €350m and 
€90m, the Enhanced Safety strategy is better.  But if the risk tolerance of the parent bank 
were below €90m, none of the two e-banking proposals would be acceptable, even the 
Enhanced Safety strategy would be perceived as too risky.   
 
 (b) The value of Additional Information/Analysis 
 
There is a great simplifying virtue in focusing an analysis on decisions that matter.  A 
situation like the choice of e-banking strategies that we have just considered is fraught with 
complexities and uncertainties but it is not necessary to study every detail to reach rational 
decisions.  For example, we have just seen that it is not necessary to pin down very precisely 
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made this key choice, one can proceed to refine the chosen strategy and worry less about risk 
tolerance. 
 
Another example would be the value of ascertaining with greater confidence the probability 
of a super-virus strike during the effective life of the venture.  We commented earlier that 
such probabilities are difficult to assess; given half a chance, experts will disagree! But we 
also said that uncertainty about a low probability event is not so important.  The reason should 
be clear now – the expected utility criterion is nearly linear in the probability of rare events, 
therefore an average probability will do.  Of course it may matter whether the average, or best 
guess is, say for the Standard Safety strategy, 5% as we have assumed, or 3%, or 7%; that can 
be tested. 
 
By re-calculating the certain equivalent with higher probabilities of super-virus strikes, we 
would find that, at the €500m risk tolerance level, the probability of a strike would have to be 
greater than 8.5% under the Standard Safety strategy to justify switching to the Enhanced 
Safety strategy.  Refining the analysis of the probability of a strike to improve its accuracy 
would add costs and delays.  It would not be worthwhile, because it would not affect the key 
strategic decision, unless there is a chance that the findings could lead to a probability 
estimate larger than 8.5%.  Thus the value of refining the analysis depends on the uncertainty 
shrouding the initial estimate, the improvement in accuracy expected from further studies and, 
of course, the risk attitude of the company.  In the current situation with a coefficient of risk 
tolerance of €500m, further studies of the strike probability would not be worth very much as 
they would be unlikely to lead to an improved decision.  By contrast, if the coefficient of risk 
tolerance was only €350m, we would not be sure which of the two strategies is best and better 
information on the probability of a strike would help select the best alternative; better 
information would be quite valuable
22.   
 
Displaying the domains of parameter values over which one strategy is better than another 
requires more calculations but helps identify critical parameters and reduces the task of 
assessing their values to judging in which ranges they are.  This approach is often referred to 
as the extensive form of decision analysis.  
 
(c) The Value of Insurance and Risk Sharing 
 
Finally, armed with a quantitative statement of risk attitude, we can address in the same 
consistent way a number of other decisions where uncertainty matters.  The process of 
encoding risk attitude into a utility function would be hardly worthwhile if only one critical 
decision had to be analysed, but it is likely that a firm would like to examine a number of 
problems, be they exceptional operational or business risks, with the same tool.  To illustrate, 
consider the general problem of sharing or totally transferring some risks through insurance. 
 
                                                         
22 As ‘back-of-the-envelope’ calculation, suppose that the initial estimate of 5% strike probability has 
an uncertainty represented by a normal distribution with standard deviation s1; a refined analysis could 
reduce the uncertainty to s2 (s2<s1).  With a €350m risk tolerance both strategies have about the same 
value (certain equivalent) of €425m.  But the value of the Standard Safety strategy decreases by  €38m 
per percentage point increase in the probability of a strike.  Perfect information would leads us to 
chooses the Enhanced Safety strategy if the probability of a strike turned out to be greater than 5%, a 
saving of  €38m per percentage point above 5%, that is, an expected saving equal to the value of a call 
at 5% on the probability of a strike at €38m per point.  Perfect information would be worth about 
(0.4)(38)s1; e.g., €22.8m if s1 were equal to 1.5%.  But perfect information may remain a dream; if the 
residual uncertainty is s2>0, the information would still be worth (0.4)(38)(s1-s2); e.g., €7.6m if 
s2=1% and s1=1.5%. ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2002-21 
Copyright Jacques Pezier, 2002 
20
There are many reasons why firms, like individuals, buy insurance – force of habit, 
convenience, sometimes legal requirements – but fundamentally it should be based on 
economic reasons.  The value of the insured risk net of insurance premium should be greater 
than the value of the uninsured risk.  Within our valuation framework, for value, read certain 
equivalent.  We complete our case study of e-banking by estimating what would be the value 
of insuring the venture against a super-virus. 
 
For the sake of simplicity, we confine our analysis to the maximum value of an insurance that 
would provide a 100% cover all economic consequences related to a super-virus strike and 
nothing else
23.  This is the maximum value we would be prepared to pay for a single, front-
end premium; knowing this value would help decide whether various insurance proposals 
could be attractive.  The calculation of the maximum insurance premium P would in general 
be iterative, that is, we would have to solve the equation 
 
Certain Equivalent (insured strategy – P) = Certain Equivalent (non-insured strategy) 
 
by searching over P.  With the exponential utility function we have chosen, the solution for P 
can be directly obtained since 
 
Certain Equivalent (insured strategy – P) = Certain Equivalent (insured strategy) – P 
 
The maximum economic insurance premium for both strategies is shown in Figure 4 over a 
wide range of risk tolerance.  Not surprisingly, it is much higher for the Standard Safety 
strategy, which is more vulnerable to a super-virus, than for the Enhanced Safety strategy.  
For both strategies, the maximum economic premium decreases with increasing levels of risk 
tolerance but remains always larger than the expected loss being covered.  The expected 
losses due to a super-virus are easy to calculate: for the Standard Safety strategy it is €60m (= 
5%(800 - (-400)) and for the Enhanced Safety strategy only €4.25m  (= 0.5%(500 - (-350)).  
For example, at the €500m risk tolerance level the maximum economic insurance premia 
would be €203m for the Standard Safety strategy and €11m for the Enhanced Safety strategy.  
These figures are markedly larger than the respective expected losses, leaving room for a 
profit margin and a risk premium for the would be insurer. 
 
                                                         
23 Note that we do not address here the possible effect that the existence of an insurance contract could 
have on the potential claim amount.  We alluded earlier to the fact that the total capital invested in the 
company would put a limit on the maximum amount of losses to the parent.  The existence of an 
insurance contract could lift up this limit unless an equivalent maximum loss amount was stated in the 
contract.  But then the venture, and therefore the parent company, could still make excess losses and 
that would make the cover less valuable.  On the other hand, the existence of an insurance contract 
could justify a reduction of the regulatory capital of the e-banking venture, thus making the insurance 
contract more valuable.  Without pretending that the two effects would cancel each other, we shall 
ignore these thorny issues for the sake of simplicity.  In a real life situation, the proposed methodology 
could be readily extended to cover such issues. ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2002-21 
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But is it likely indeed that insurance could be obtained at a lower cost than its maximum 
value?  Why should an insurance company be in a better position than the parent bank to 
absorb the potential losses?  We can apply the same methodology to calculate the minimum 
premium that an insurance company would be willing to accept.  
 
Covering the e-banking venture designed under the Standard Safety strategy against the risk 
of a super-virus attack could cost an insurance company a net present value of €1200m with 
an uncertainty of €283m if a strike took place; at least, that is what the parent company would 
think based on their analysis.  The €283m uncertainty is the uncertainty between the gains 
without the virus and the losses with the virus, two independent uncertainties of €200m each 
for the insurance company
24.  The corresponding figures for the Enhanced Safety strategy 
would be €850m with an uncertainty of  €250m (combining independent uncertainties of 
€200m and €150m).  Of course, the insurer could carry out a different analysis with different 
estimates and parameters but for the time being lets assume that the insurer and the parent 
bank agree on the risks. 
 
As compensation the insurer would receive a front-end premium Q.  What should be the 
minimum economic value of Q?  If we pursue a similar analysis of the certain equivalent of 
the insurance contract for the insurer, the minimum premium value would solve: 
 
Certain Equivalent (Q – Liabilities) = 0 
 
                                                         
24 For the parent company these two uncertainties are not independent.  The losses in case of a virus 
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Given that the liabilities for the insurer have the same expected value but a greater uncertainty 
than the corresponding risk reduction for the parent bank, for equal levels of risk attitude, it is 
clear that there would be no possible insurance deal.  The minimum premium requested by 
the insurer would exceed the maximum premium that the parent bank would be willing to 
pay.  Figure 5 below, confirms this point by comparing the maximum value of the insurance 
cover (as in Figure 4) with the minimum cost of the cover to the insurer for various levels of 
risk tolerance.   
 
Figure 5:  Maximum Economic Value versus 
 Minimum Economic Cost of Insurance  
 

























For example, the figures for the base case €500m risk tolerance level are: 
 
Table 8: Comparison of Acceptable Insurance Premia 
for Insurer and Insured with the same €500m Risk Tolerance Coefficient 
 
Insurance Premium  Standard Safety  Enhanced Safety 
Maximum value to the bank  €203 million  €11 million 
Minimum cost to the insurer  €234 million  €13 million 
 
 
Under what circumstances would insurance become economically viable (leaving aside patent 
errors or accounting and regulatory distortions)?  Our analysis reveals three situations that 
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1. The transferred risk provides more diversification (or hedging) to the insurer than to 
the insured 
2. The insurance company has a greater coefficient of risk tolerance than the insured, 
possibly because it has a much larger capital. 
3. A partial insurance cover is considered 
 
The first situation is the reverse of what we observed in our case study and which caused the 
excess of cost over value. It may occur if a bank wishes to insure some of several positively 
correlated risks and, on the other hand, the insurance company seeks to diversify its risks
25.  
 
The second situation can be found either when large insurance companies insure small clients 
or when the risk of a large client is shared with large reinsurers.  Otherwise, if insurer and 
insured are similarly capitalized there is no obvious reason why the insurer should adopt a 
more risk taking attitude.  For large risks the insured would simply exchange a business risk 
against a credit risk on the insurer, a factor that should be taken into account in the analysis of 
the value of the insurance contract. 
 
The third situation is particularly interesting because of its general applicability. One should 
note that any risky opportunity with a positive expected value is worth sharing in, no matter 
how risk averse one may be
26.  In the case of exponential utility functions it can be shown that 
the optimal sharing in a risky opportunity among various interested parties, that is the 
allocation that maximizes total expected utility, is in proportion to the coefficient of risk 
tolerance of each party.  Even small insurers can therefore insure big banks provided they 
cover only a small fraction of the risks. 
   
Conclusions 
 
We live more and more in a culture of caution where the ‘ownership’ of risks is assigned to 
individuals who may have a limited understanding of global objectives or, at any rate, are 
given limited responsibilities and personal incentives.  Thus, in some schools, little girls are 
no longer allowed to skip ropes or make daisy chains because they might get hurt or transmit 
diseases. 
 
We should have a similar concern that by institutionalising a risk management function in 
financial firms and creating separate departments with responsibilities restricted to specific 
types of risks – as if these risks could be treated separately and independently of the 
economics of the main business activities –  we may be creating an environment that is not 
conducive to good management. 
 
A balance has to be found between the need, on one hand, to develop specific risk analysis 
skills and to have independent reviews of the risk management process and, on the other 
hand, the need to integrate all the elements that are necessary to reach intelligent decisions 
balancing risks and rewards. 
 
                                                         
25 Major insurance disaster have been caused more often by small but highly correlated losses (e.g., 
asbestos or collapse in residual value of leased computers) than by major single losses which are 
normally shared through reinsurance. 
26 In footnote (23) we show that the risk discount D varies proportionally to the variance of a risky 
project and therefore proportionally to the square of the share in that prospect, whereas the expected 
value varies proportionally to the share itself.  Therefore, when the share is decreased, at some point 
the risk discount is bound to become smaller than the expected value of the small share.  ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2002-21 
Copyright Jacques Pezier, 2002 
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Finding the right balance is particularly relevant when considering operational risks.  It would 
be naïve to assume that operational risks must be minimized – that unlike credit and market 
risks, which must be accepted to some degree in order to generate a profit, operational risks 
should be eliminated as far as possible
27.  The main difference between operational, credit and 
market risks is that the last two can be manipulated by adding or taking away risks at market 
price, i.e., without affecting the current fair value of the activity (except for transaction costs), 
whereas operational risks can only be altered at a cost, hence the importance of taking 
expenses and revenues into account. 
 
We argued that the framework for operational risk management should be focused on 
improving decision, that is on evaluating alternatives to the status quo, taking into account all 
major consequences rather than just the impact on operational risks.  It is all very well to 
collect operational loss data and to monitor so-called Key-Risk-Indicators (KRI) and Key-
Risk-Drivers (KRD) but unless KRDs are clearly defined as decision variables and all 
consequences of these decisions, not only their effects on KRIs or even on operational losses, 
are taken into account, no progress towards better management will be made.   
 
To carry out a decision focused approach, we found that it would be useful to distinguish 
various types of operational risks based on the relative importance of uncertainties compared 
to expected losses.   
 
Routine risks, that is, operational loss events that may occur once a week or more frequently, 
are at the very low end of the uncertainty scale; it is expected losses, both direct and indirect 
(reputation) and impact on costs and revenues that count.  Bankers could learn a lot from the 
discipline of Total Quality Management that has been applied very successfully in other 
industries, to manage nominal operational risks. 
 
We called ordinary risks those operational loss events that would happen less frequently than 
once a week and could be as rare as once every few years.  Both the uncertainties and the 
expected losses generated by ordinary risks are significant.   It is crucial is to assess the 
relationships between these risks and other risks to obtain a comprehensive picture of risks 
and rewards. 
 
We signaled out as extraordinary risks operational loss events that are very unlikely (say 2% 
or less probability of occurrence per year) but would have devastating effects if they occurred.  
There again it is important to establish how these risks would interact with others, but one 
new ingredient, the risk attitude of the firm, becomes paramount for choosing the best risk 
control method (risk mitigation, insurance, outsourcing, etc.).  Many financial institutions 
and, indeed, regulators talk about risk appetite or similar expressions, but very few have gone 
as far as quantifying this concept to make it useful for decision making.  Perhaps banks 






                                                         
27 It is interesting to note that in the revised draft on Sound Practices [4], Basel kept the statement (p4)  
“… it is clear that operational risk differ from other banking risks in that it is typically not taken in 
return for an expected reward…” but adds in a footnote “However, the Committee recognizes that in 
some business lines … the decision to incur operational risk, or compete based on the ability to manage 
and effectively price this risk, is an integral part of the bank’s risk/reward calculus.”  ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2002-21 
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Appendix: Utility Theory 
 
 
Utility theory, as developed by J. von Neumann and O. Morgenstern, rests on only three 
behavioural assumptions:  (1) all outcomes of the decisions under examination can be ranked 
in order of preference; that is, if among three outcomes A, B and C, we strictly prefer A to B 
and B to C then we ought to strictly prefer A to C; (2) if, as in (1), we strictly preferred A to B 
and B to C, then for some probability p, we should be indifferent between receiving B for sure 
or having a probability p of receiving A and (1-p) of receiving C; (3) Among two risky 
opportunities offering the same possible outcomes, we ought to prefer the opportunity 
presenting the larger probability of obtaining the preferred outcome 
 
Few decision makers would refuse to accept these rules.  Indeed, if they were shown to 
violate any of these rules, they would probably want to modify their behaviour to conform to 
these rules. 
 
The powerful consequence of these simple rules is that matters of choice between risky 
opportunities can be resolved by attributing a utility value to each outcome and calculating 
the expected utility of each opportunity.  The opportunity with the maximum expected utility 
ought to be preferred over the others. 
 
Assigning utilities to possible outcomes is the critical step to which we will come back 
shortly.  But let us remark first that, for financial decisions, outcomes will already be 
measured on a monetary scale. Utilities will therefore form a continuous, non-decreasing 
function (because we can be trusted to prefer always a bit more money to less) over a range of 
possible monetary outcomes as illustrated below. 
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It is the curvature of this function that captures the degree of risk attitude of the firm.  A 
downward expresses a certain degree of risk aversion
28; the minimum selling price of a risky 
opportunity shall be less than its expected value.  For example, faced with a risk of winning or 
losing €500m with equal probabilities, the firm with the utility function above would perceive 
an expected utility of about –270; that has the same utility as a sure loss of €220m.  In other 
words, the firm would be willing to pay someone €220m to take the risk away.  The sure 
quantity equivalent to a risky prospect, i.e., its minimum selling price, is often referred to as 
its certain equivalent.  Choosing the alternative with the maximum expected utility amounts 
to choosing the alternative with the maximum certain equivalent. 
 
Drawing a utility function for a firm is a tricky exercise best conducted by an experienced 
outsider.  A few points along the curve can be inferred from choices directors and executives 
would agree to make among simple risky prospects.  The results would probably form an 
elongated cluster of points rather than a smooth monotonic function, but precision is not all 
                                                         
28 Consider a risky prospect X with expected value E(X) and variance Var(X), and a utility curve u(x). 
From the first couple of terms of a Taylor series expansion of u(x) at the expected value E(X) we 
obtain: E(u(x)) = u(E(X)) + 1/2 u’’(E(X))Var(X).  Equating this to the utility of E(X) – D, where D 
stands for a the risk discount, which we approximate with u(E(X)) – D u’(E(X)), we obtain the 
approximate risk discount value D = -1/2 (u’’/u’) Var(X) which shows that the risk discount is 
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that important and a free hand curve drawn through a first set of points will be a good start for 
further debates. 
 
To ensure a smooth function (i.e., without sharp kinks as it often happens on first assessment) 
one can try to fit a known functional form, for example, an exponential, a logarithmic or a 
power curve.  An ancillary benefit is that a simple functional form (defined within a positive 
linear transformation
29) can be summarized by one curvature parameter. 
 
For example, a firm could adopt an exponential utility curve.  Parameterised as 
 
u(x) = l(1 – exp(-x/l) 
 
utilities are nearly equal to monetary values for small amounts (x << l); parameter l is 
directly related to the curvature
30 and describes the degree of risk tolerance of the firm.  For 
large l the utility function becomes almost linear, that is the firm would be risk neutral, 
whereas for small l the firm would be risk averse.  The exponential utility curve has a few 
interesting properties that may appeal.  For example, if a sure quantity (positive or negative) 
is added to all outcomes, the certain equivalent is modified by that quantity.  Therefore there 
is no need to define an absolute zero on the outcome scale; the same exponential utility 
function can be used for different decisions simultaneously or over time (provided that 
correlations between risks are taken into account). 
 
If the outcome variable X is normally distributed with expected value E(X) and variance 
Var(X) the certain equivalent with an exponential utility is: 
 
CE = E(X) –(1/2l) Var(X) 
 
that is, the maximum expected utility (or maximum certain equivalent) criterion reduces to a 
mean/variance criterion in which the trade off between expected value and risk (measured by 
a variance) is directly related to the coefficient of risk tolerance l. 
 
This property can used to obtain an approximate but quick estimation of the risk tolerance of 
a firm.  Suppose a firm is presented with a 50/50 chance to gain x or to lose x/2 immediately.  
The opportunity has a positive expected value of x/4; it is therefore attractive for small values 
of x when the risk is acceptable. It is easy to see, using the mean/variance criterion above, that 
it will become unattractive when x becomes large; there is indifference between accepting and 
rejecting the opportunity when x is of the order of the coefficient of risk tolerance l. 
 
The expression for the certain equivalent of an exponential utility curve also shows that 
certain equivalents of independent prospects can be added (both expected values and 
variances of independent risks are additive).  In particular, new projects can be analysed 
without referring to the risks inherent in the status quo situation, provided the new risks are 
independent from the existing risks. 
 
                                                         
29 Mathematical expectations being a linear operator, maximum expected utility choices are invariant 
under any positive linear transformation of the utility scale. 
30 The curvature defined as u’’/u’ is equal to –1/l and is therefore constant.  The exponential utility 
function is said to show constant absolute risk aversion (CARA).  By comparison, a logarithmic utility 
function would show constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) 